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Abstract
We give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium
without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no
monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisﬁed, we are still able to prove the
existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an exogenous and explicit tie breaking mechanism.
As a basis for these results, we obtain a characterization lemma that is valid under a general
setting, that includes non-independent types, asymmetrical utilities and any attitude towards
risk. Such characterization gives a basis for an intuitive interpretation for the behavior of the
bidder: to bid in order to equalize the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost of bidding.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C62, C72, D44, D82.
Keywords: auctions, pure strategy equilibria, non-monotonic bidding functions, tie-breaking
rules
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main contributions of this paper are the following: (1) a general lemma of characterization of
the optimum bidding behavior; (2) necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of regular
equilibria in auctions, that is, equilibria without ties with positive probability or gaps in the support
of the winning bids; (3) a tie-breaking rule to ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibria when
these necessary and suﬃcient conditions do not hold, that is, when ties with positive probability
are inevitable. Additionally, we provide some models to analyze auctions with multidimensional
bids.
The rest of this introduction describes the results, as well as the assumptions, relevance and
the method of proof. Section 2 describes the general model, while section 3 presents the character-
ization lemma which is valid in the context of this general model. Section 4 describes the Indirect
Auction Approach, which allows us to prove the existence of equilibrium for multidimensional,
∗We are grateful to Sergio O. Parreiras and Flavio Menezes for helpful comments. This research was supported
by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientiﬁco e Tecnologico (CNPq).
1non-monotonic auctions. Also in section 4, we present the (exogenous) tie-breaking rule, which
ensures the existence of equilibrium for all auctions in our class. Section 5 exempliﬁes how to use
the approach described in section 4 to analyze auctions with multidimensional bids. Section 6
concludes with a discussion about the limits of our results and reviews the contributions of the
paper in light of the related literature.
1.1 Basic Principle of Bidding
Many experimental and empirical works suggest that the participants of auctions do (or at least
may) not follow their equilibrium strategies.1 Although there is a considerable debate about this
point, it highlights the assumption that equilibrium behavior might be too strong. An alternative
approach is to assume only that the players follow rationalizable strategies, instead of equilibrium
strategies. Pursuing this idea, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) show that some empirical and ex-
perimental ﬁndings can be explained. Nevertheless, they still assume what Harsanyi (1967-8) calls
consistency of beliefs, that is, the subjective probability that players attribute to the distribution
of types of the opponents is just a conditional distribution and the conditional distribution of all
players comes from the same prior distribution.2 This is almost always assumed in game theory,
but does not need to be true, as Harsanyi stresses. Indeed, at the beginning of the iteration be-
tween players, they may have inconsistent beliefs. As a result, the ﬁrst rounds of the game do not
satisfy the consistency of beliefs and have to be discarded in order to use the received theory.
Of course, one may think that nothing can be said without this basic assumption. We show,
on the contrary, that something interesting can be said. If we adhere to the even weaker assump-
tion that bidders are rational, then we prove that they act in order to equalize their marginal
utility to the marginal cost of bidding. This basic principle can provide insights for empirical and
experimental studies, since every bid (even the initial or the apparently inconsistent ones) bears
valuable information about the beliefs of the players. Also, the principle holds under fairly general
conditions, which are given by the Characterization Lemma.
The Characterization Lemma is valid for dependent types (with arbitrary dimension), asym-
metric utilities with any attitude towards risk and does not require assumptions as to monotonicity
or separability of transfers. The model embraces all kind of sealed-bid auctions where each player
is interested in just one object (to buy or sell).
When one introduces the additional hypotheses of risk neutrality, symmetry and monotonicity
of the utility function, the characterization provided by the Lemma reduces to the ﬁrst-order
conditions obtained by Milgrom and Weber (1982) for ﬁrst- and second-price auctions, by Krishna
and Morgan (1997) for the all-pay auction and war of attrition, and by Williams (1991) for buyers’-
bids double auctions.
1.2 Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Equilibria Existence
Two long-standing assumptions in auction theory are that types (private information) are unidi-
mensional and that utilities (the value of the object being auctioned) are monotonic with types.
Although there have been recent eﬀorts to generalize the equilibria existence for multidimensional
types (e.g. McAdams (2003a)), we are not aware of any theoretical construction for non-monotonic
auctions.3
1For a survey of experimental works, see Kagel (1995) and for the empirical literature on auction data, see Laﬀont
(1997).
2This is also called common prior assumption.
3Zheng (2001) analyzes a model where private information is the budget constraint, and the bidding behavior
can be non-monotonic. Nevertheless, there is also a monotonic equilibrium. McAdams (2003b) gives an example
with three bidders and aﬃliated types, where a non-monotonic equilibrium can exist. Athey and Levin (2001)
and Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003) also give examples of non-monotonic bidding functions, but where the bids are
multidimensional – a setting that we consider in section 5. None of these papers sets out to build a theory for
non-monotonic equilibria.
2This is probably due to the understanding that monotonicity seems a reasonable assumption
when dealing with unidimensional types. Nevertheless, it is clearly less appealing when multidi-
mensional types are considered.4 So, it is desirable that a theory of multidimensional auctions
should deal with non-monotonic assumptions.
Nevertheless, even for the unidimensional setting, things are not simple. An example provided
by Jacskon, Simon, Swinkels and Zame (2002) (henceforth JSSZ) illustrates the diﬃculties.5 The
example is a ﬁrst-price auction with two bidders, whose signals are uniformly distributed in [0,1]
and utilities are given by ui (t)=v(ti,t −i)=5+ti − 4t−i. They show that such an example
does not have an equilibrium without a special tie-breaking rule.
While developing the theory for general multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions, we
ﬁnd the reason why this example does not possess equilibrium. Indeed, it does not satisfy the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium that we present in
our Theorem 3. Theorem 3 applies to a class of symmetric interdependent values auctions (where
the separable utilities case above is a particular example) with independent types.6 Contrary to
what one would expect, the conditions are in general easy to check.
If the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of Theorem 3 are not satisﬁed, the received literature
can ensure the existence of equilibrium just through the result of JSSZ. This result gives the
existence in mixed strategies and accepts an endogenous tie-breaking rule as the solution concept.
In Theorem 4, we prove that if the conditions of Theorem 3 are not met, there exists a ﬁxed and
previously known tie-breaking rule that it is capable of implying the equilibrium existence in pure
strategies. We call this the modiﬁed second-price auction tie-breaking rule and it applies to all
kinds of auctions considered.
Our approach also provides expressions for the multidimensional strategies (even under the
occurrence of ties), for auction formats that include, as special cases, the ﬁrst-price, second-price,
(ﬁrst-price) all-pay auctions and war of attrition (second-price all-pay auction). The expressions
are simple, due to the method that we follow to simplify the problem. We call it the Indirect
Auction Approach and describe it below. We emphasize that it is of interest even to unidimensional
auctions, as we discuss in section 6.
1.3 Detailed Description of the Indirect Auction Approach
Under the standard rule of auctions, higher bids correspond to higher probability of winning. If
a bidding function b(·) is ﬁxed and followed by all participants in a symmetric auction, we can
associate to each bid (and so, to each type), a probability of winning. All types that bid the same
bid under b(·) have the same probability of winning. This allows us to introduce the concept of
conjugation. If b(t)=b(s), and hence, t and s have the same probability of winning, we say that
t and s are conjugated.7
The use of the probability of winning as analytical tool is not new in auction theory. Sometimes
in the literature, what we call conjugation is named “reduced form”: “The function relating a
bidder’s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction.” (Border, 1991, p.
1175). See also Matthews (1984) and Chen (1986). So, what we will call “indirect auction” can be
also called “reduced form auction”. These papers analyze problems related to the characterization
and existence of optimal auctions. So, the auction is treated, as do Myerson (1981), only by
considering the probability of winning and the payments. In turn, our problem is that of ﬁnding
the equilibrium for ﬁxed auction rules. It is in light of these diﬀerences and in the attempt to
do not confuse terms that we decided to maintain our original terminology. A further reason
for the adoption of a diﬀerent terminology comes from the fact that the indirect auction is not
4S e ee x a m p l e s8 ,9a n d1 0i ns e c t i o n4 .
5Their example was developed from Example 3 of Maskin and Riley (2000).
6The assumptions of Theorem 3 are related to a condition of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). Theorems 1 and 2
hold under more general conditions.
7The use of conjugations is an idea borrowed from Araujo and Moreira (2000).
3“equivalent” to the direct one. So, it is not a merely “reduced form” of the auction. (See Remark
1 on subsection 4.3).
Returning to the description of the method, the main idea is to reparametrize the types and
to associate to all conjugated types s ∈ S, the probability of winning the auction. As stated, this
idea should seem unpromising since the probability of winning will be diﬀerent for each diﬀerent
bidding function that we begin with. Moreover, we cannot talk about conjugation if we do not
previously ﬁx a bidding function.
To overcome these problems, we deﬁne conjugations without needing to mention bidding func-
tions. The deﬁnition comes from an insight acquired from the above notion of conjugation. We
deﬁne conjugations as a suitable reparametrization of the types. Once we have deﬁned conjuga-
t i o n si ns u b s e c t i o n4 . 1 ,w ec a nd e ﬁne in subsection 4.2 the Indirect Auction.8 For this, we simply
integrate the utilities of the direct auction for all types that are conjugated. From our deﬁnition
of conjugation, the indirect auction is now an auction (of the same format as the direct auction,
that is, a ﬁrst-price auction if the original auction is a ﬁrst-price auction), between two players
with independent signals, uniformly distributed in [0,1]. This makes the analysis of equilibrium
existence easier. An important result of the subsection 4.2 is the relationship between the payoﬀs
of direct and indirect auctions, which is made in Proposition 2.
With these preparatory results, we can ﬁnally deal with the problem of equilibrium existence in
subsection 4.3. First, we prove that the existence of a regular equilibrium implies nice properties
for the conjugation that it deﬁnes. This is the content of Theorem 1. These properties are almost
suﬃcient for the existence of the equilibrium, which is proved in Theorem 2: since we have deﬁned
the conjugation without mentioning a bidding function, then whenever we can ﬁnd a conjugation
that meets the conditions of Theorem 2, there exists a regular equilibrium of the direct auction.
These conditions are just slightly stronger than the necessary conditions given by Theorem 1.
Thus, Theorem 2 turns the problem of equilibrium existence into that of ﬁnding a conjugation
that meets its conditions. If we manage to ﬁnd the correct conjugation, we are done. We show
how to perform this task in two examples (6 and 7) at the end of subsection 4.3.
In subsection 4.4, we treat a case of utilities that include the separable utilities as a special case,
that is, v(ti,t −i)=v1 (ti)+v2 (t−i). For the setting deﬁned there, we are able to give necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of regular equilibrium (Theorem 3). This is very useful,
because it explain why Example 1 of JSSZ fails. But it raises the question: what can be done if
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of Theorem 3 are not met?
Theorem 4 provides the answer. If we conduct a modiﬁed second-price auction, the equilibrium
exists in pure strategies with ties of positive probability. This last result has advantages over the
result of JSSZ: it is in pure strategies, the tie-breaking rule is exogenously given, it is valid for all
kind of auctions, it is fairly simple and it does not require the announcement of types. Concluding
section 4, we show in subsection 4.5 that our approach can be extended to the case of risk aversion.
1.4 Multidimensional Bids
As an illustration of the Indirect Auction Approach, in section 5 we generalize two models of
procurement auctions with multidimensional bids, as proposed by Che (1993) and by Ewerhart
and Fieseler (2003). The analysis can also be adapted to timber auctions, described by Athey and
Levin (2001). Nevertheless, this paper does not treat multi-unit auctions.
8This terminology comes from the “Taxation Principle” which allows us to implement the optimal direct truthful
mechanism through some convenient indirect one. In this case, we are implementing the equilibrium in the auction
using an indirect auction obtained from reparametrizing types through the probability of winning.
42 The Model
There are N players.9 Player i (i =1 ,...,N) receives a private information, ti,a n dc h o o s e sa n
action that is a real number (i.e., he submits a bid bi). The “auction house” computes the bids and
determines who “wins” and who “looses”. If player i wins, he receives ui (t,b) and if she looses,
she receives ui (t,b),w h e r et =( ti,t −i) is the proﬁle of all signals and b =( bi,b −i) is the proﬁle of
bids submitted.10
Information
We assume that the private signal of each player, ti, lives in an arbitrary probabilistic space,
(Ti,=i,τi). We assume that the product space, (T,=,τ), is such that τ is absolutely continuous
with respect to the product ×N
i=1τi of its marginals.
Bidding
After receiving the private information, each player submits a sealed proposal, that is, a bid
(or oﬀer) that is a real number. A negative bid is equivalent to the non-participation decision (in
which case the payoﬀ is normalized to zero).11 We assume that the maximum permitted bid is M,
to rule out behaviors (equilibria) in which one bidder bids arbitrarily high and the others bid zero.
This is a weak assumption, although it imposes some restriction on certain auction formats such
as third-price auctions.
Mechanism of allocation
We suppose that each bidder sees a number that depends only on the bids submitted by the
opponents and that determines the threshold of the winning and losing events. We denote such
number as b(−i). For instance, if the auction is a one-object auction where all players are buyers,
b(−i) is the maximum bid of the opponents, that is, b(−i) ≡ maxj6=i bj.I f t h e r e a r e K objects
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Double auctions among S sellers (players 1,2,...,S)a n dN −S buyers (players S+1,...,N)c a n
be described similarly. There are two cases to consider. If S>N− S, then buyers get the object
as long as they bid at least the minimum bid of the sellers. So, we put b(−i) ≡ minj=1,...,S bj if
player i is a buyer. There is competition among sellers. Then, a player i 6 S sells the object if and
only if bi is below the minimum bid of buyers and if it is among the N − S lowest bids of sellers.
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all sellers but player i. The case when there are more buyers (that is, S 6 N − S) is similar. If
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among all buyers but player i. If the player i is a seller, b(−i) ≡ minj=S+1,...,N bj.
A third part (the auction house) computes the bids and determines what is the result of the
game for each player. If bi < 0 (that is, player i does not participate), the payoﬀ is 0.I fbi >b (−i),
the auction house declares player i “holder of an object” (and he has an ex-post payoﬀ ui (t,b) in
this situation). If 0 6 bi <b (−i), the auction house declares that player i is not a holder of an
object (and he receives ui (t,b)).13
9Our model is inspired in auction games, although it can encompass a general class of discontinuous games. For
convenience and easy understanding, we will use the terminology of auction theory, such as “bidding functions” and
“bids” for strategies and actions, respectively.
10We consider the dependence on b instead of bi because we want to include in our results auctions where the
payoﬀ depends on bids of the opponents, such as the second-price auction, for instance. Also, this allows the study
of “exotic” auctions, i.e., auctions where the payment is an arbitrary function of all bids.
11We are implicitly assuming a reserve price of at least zero. This is not essential, but multiple equilibria may
exist without it, as pointed out by Milgrom and Weber (1982).
12If there is no reserve price, simply omit b0.
13In most auctions, ui is normalized as 0. However, in double and all-pay auctions or if there is an entry fee, this
is not the case.
5Observe that if player i is a seller, he begins with an object and if bi <b (−i), he sells his object.
If he is a buyer, the situation bi <b (−i) corresponds to maintaining his previous situation: without
the object. We can therefore treat buyers and sellers with the same formulation. It is possible
to distinguish them, through the following conditions: if player i is a buyer, then ∂biui (t,b),
∂biui (t,b) 6 0 for all (t,b).I fp l a y e ri is a seller, we can assume that ∂biui (t,b), ∂biui (t,b) > 0
for all (t,b). The motivation for this deﬁnition is clear. Without changing the event of winning or
losing, a higher bid may (weakly) beneﬁt the seller and hurt a buyer. In auctions, this is a very
natural discrimination, although in more general games it can be less appealing. We emphasize
that these assumptions are only for purposes of interpretation. We do not use them in the results
below.
If bi = b(−i), there is a tie, and a speciﬁc rule – which may include a random device and/or the
requirement of a further action ai – determines if the player is a winner or a loser.14 We model
this by saying that the player receives uT
i (t,b,a), a value between ui (t,b) and ui (t,b).15 We do
not need to specify uT
i (t,b,a) for the ﬁrst two results.
This setting is very general and applies to a broad class of discontinuous games. For example,
ui (t,b)=vi (t) − bi and ui (t,b)=0correspond to a ﬁrst-price auction with risk neutrality.16 If
ui (t,b)=vi (t) − bi and ui (t,b)=−bi we have the all-pay auction. If ui (t,b)=vi (t) − b(−i)
and ui (t,b)=−bi, this is the war of attrition. As pointed out by Lizzeri and Persico (2000), we
can have also combinations of these games. For example, ui (t,b)=vi (t)−αbi −(1 − α)b(−i) and
ui (t,b)=0 ,w i t hα ∈ (0,1), gives a combination of the ﬁrst- and second-price auctions. Another
possibility is the third-price auction or an auction where the payment is a general function of the
others’ bids. It is also useful to consider K-unit auctions with unitary demand, among N buyers,
1 <K<N . Then, b(−i) = b
−i
(K). Then, a pay-your-bid auction is given by ui (t,b)=vi (ti)− bi
and ui (t,b)=0 . If it is a uniform price with the price determined by the highest looser’s bid,
ui (t,b)=vi (ti)− b(−i) and ui (t,b)=0 . If it is a uniform price with the price determined by the
lowest winner’s bid, ui (t,b)=0 , ui (t,b)=vi (ti)− b(−i) if bi >b
−i
(K−1) and ui (t,b)=vi (ti)− bi
otherwise. Observe that even in this last case, ui (t,b) is continuous if vi (ti) is.
Notation
In order to avoid confusion, we will use bold letters to denote bidding functions, i.e., b =
(bi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I L1 (Ti,[−1,M]).I fw eﬁx the other’s strategies, b−i,l e tFb(−i) (bi|ti) ≡ τ−i ({t−i :
b−i (t−i) <b i}|ti) and fb(−i) (·|ti) be its Radon-Nykodim derivative with respect to the Lebesgue
measure, i.e., the density function.17 We use the notation F⊥
b(−i) (·|ti) for the distribution function
of the singular part of the measure Fb(−i) (·|ti), that is, the part that assigns positive measure to
sets of bids with zero Lebesgue measure.
If the proﬁle b−i is ﬁxed, the expected payoﬀ of bidder i of type ti, when bidding bi,i s :
Πi(ti,b i,b−i) ≡
Z h






14The required action can be the submission of another bid for a Vickrey auction (as in Maskin and Riley (2000))
or the announcement of the type (as in JSSZ). Since the only revealed information in the case of a tie is its occurrence,
the action can be required together with the submission of the bid.
15The speciﬁcation of a tie-breaking rule is important for the existence of equilibria, as shown by Jackson et
al. (2002). With this terminology, the proposal of an “endogenous tie-breaking rule” of Simon and Zame (1990)
corresponds to specifying endogenously uT
i in order to ensure the equilibrium existence.
16If we put ui (t,b)=Ui (vi (t) − bi) we can have any attitude towards risk.
17Note that, with such convention, the cumulative distribution functions - c.d.f.’s - are left continuous.
6if bi ∈ [0,M] and Πi(ti,b i,b−i)=0if bi < 0. It is worth observing that if the probability of bid
bi being equal to b(−i), conditional on ti, is zero, the tie-breaking rule is not important and the
second term in the integral may be omitted.
Again, when there is no possibility of confusion, we will write Πi(ti,b i) for Πi(ti,b i,b−i) and
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where ui ≡ ui − ui is the net payoﬀ.
3 The Basic Principle of Bidding
Our ﬁrst result is a characterization of the payoﬀ through its derivative with respect to the bid
given by an integral expression, i.e., a kind of fundamental theorem of calculus. For this, we will
need the following assumption:
(H) ui and ui are absolutely continuous on bi and ∂biui and ∂biui are essentially bounded.
Lemma 1 (Payoﬀ Characterization) –A s s u m e( H ) .F i xap r o ﬁle of bidding functions b−i.
















where ∂biΠi(ti,β) exists for almost all β and in this case it is given by
∂biΠi(ti,β)=E
h
∂biui (ti,β,·)1[β>b(−i)] + ∂biui (ti,β,·)1[β<b(−i)]|ti
i
(2)
+E[ui (ti,β,·)|ti,b(−i) = β]fb(−i) (β|ti).
Proof. The proof follows the demonstration of the Leibiniz rule. The main point is the use
of a theorem of Rudin (1966) on the derivatives of measures and its integral expression. See the
details in the Appendix A.¥
The most important part of Lemma 1 is the expression of ∂biΠi(ti,β).O n eo ft h eb e s tw a y st o
understand Lemma 1 is through the following:
Corollary 2 (The Basic Principle of Bidding) – Under regularity assumptions, the op-
timum bid is such that the marginal cost of bidding is equal to the marginal utility from bidding.
More formally: if Πi(ti,·) is diﬀerentiable at bi ∈ argmaxβ Πi(ti,β) and there is no tie with positive
probability at bi,t h e n





7Obverse that E[ui|ti,b(−i) = bi]fb(−i) (bi|ti) represents the marginal beneﬁt of bidding, that





represents the marginal cost of changing the bid in all the





the marginal cost of changing the bid in the events where he is loosing. Thus, we can read the
above condition in an intuitive and simple manner: at the optimum of the best-reply problem,





. Note that we do not require separability in the monetary
transfer (risk neutrality) to reach such an interpretation.
This interpretation is useful for understanding the bidding behavior. In ﬁrst-price auctions,
the marginal cost of bidding is what implies a decreasing in the way bidders bid. In second-price
auctions, the marginal cost of bidding is zero (because ∂biui =0 ), so that each bidder bids until
its marginal utility of bidding became zero.
Corollary 1 is a generalization of the necessary conditions ﬁrst-order for the ﬁrst- and second-
price auctions presented in Milgrom and Weber (1982), for the war of attrition and all-pay auctions
presented in Krishna and Morgan (1997), as we show in Examples 1- 4 below. Example 5 shows
how the Basic Principle of Bidding is concise. Such an example is the application of Corollary 1 for
double auctions and it presents a comparison with the equivalent expression obtained by Williams
(1991).
Example 1 – First-price auction
When we restrict ourselves to the case of the ﬁrst-price auction with risk neutrality (i.e., ui =0
and ui = vi − bi), then ∂biui = −1 and ∂biui =0 . The condition (3) becomes:




This (necessary) ﬁrst-order condition provides a useful way to determine best-reply bids. Note
that this expression admits non-monotonic bidding functions b(−i), contrary to Milgrom and We-
ber’s model. It also encompasses asymmetries in utilities and distribution of types. Assuming
aﬃliation and monotonic utilities, Milgrom and Weber (1982) can restrict themselves to the space
of non-decreasing symmetric bidding functions (i.e., bi = b∗, for all i ∈ I). Thus,
b(−i) (t−i)=m a x
j6=i




i.e., conditioning on b(−i) = bi is the same to conditioning on t(−i) = ti. Also, fb(−i) (bi|ti)=
ft(−i) (ti|ti)/(b∗ (ti))
0 and Fb(−i) (bi|ti)=Ft(−i) (ti|ti). With this, (4) becomes
b∗0 (s)={E
£





whose solution is shown to be an equilibrium under aﬃliation.
Example 2 – Second price auction
8In the second price auction, Milgrom and Weber’s model is equivalent to ui (t,b)=vi (t)−b(−i)
and ui (t,b)=0 . Then, ∂biui = ∂biui =0and (3) reduces to E[vi −bi|ti,b(−i) = bi] fb(−i) (bi|ti)=
0 which can be simpliﬁed to
bi = E[vi|ti,b(−i) = bi].
Again with monotonicity and symmetry assumptions, Milgrom and Weber’s expression for the
equilibrium bid function can be obtained:
b∗ (s)=E
£
v|ti = s,t(−i) = s
¤
≡ ¯ v(s,s).
Example 3 – All-pay auction
Krishna and Morgan (1997) extend the method of Milgrom and Weber (1982) to the cases
of war of attrition and all-pay auctions. In the all-pay auction, their model is equivalent to
ui (t,b)=vi (t) − b(−i) and ui (t,b)=−bi. Then, ∂biui =0and ∂biui = −1. So, (3) reduces to
E[vi (t)|ti,b(−i) = bi]fb(−i) (bi|ti)=1 .




v|ti = s,t(−i) = s
¤
ft(−i) (s|s),
whose solution they show to be an equilibrium under aﬃliation.
Example 4 – War of attrition
In the war of attrition, Krishna and Morgan (1997) model is equivalent to ui (t,b)=vi (t)−b(−i)
and ui (t,b)=−bi. Then, ∂biui =0and ∂biui = −1. So, (3) reduces to
E[vi (t)|ti,b(−i) = bi]fb(−i) (bi|ti)=1− Fb(−i) (bi|ti).
Again, with monotonicity and symmetry, they derive the equation
b∗0 (s)=E
£
v|ti = s,t(−i) = s
¤ 1 − Ft(−i) (s|s)
ft(−i) (s|s)
,
and the equilibrium is shown to exist under aﬃliation.
Example 5 – Double auction
In the analysis of a double auction with private values, risk neutrality, independent types and
symmetry among buyers and sellers, Williams (1991) assumes that the payment is determined by
the buyer’s bid. So, it is optimum for the seller to bid her value. To analyze the behavior of the




















9where f1 is the common density function of sellers, f2 is the common density function of buyers, n














i (1 − F1 (b))
n−j (1 − F2 (v))
m−1−i .
The expression (5) is just a special case of (3). In fact, the expression in brackets in (5) is just
fb(−i) (β) and Mn,m (vb,b) is Fb(−i) (β).19
An important application of the Characterization Lemma will be given in the next section
w h e r ew eg i v en e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient conditions to the existence of equilibrium in common-value
auctions with multidimensional independent types and non-monotonic utilities.
Another possibility is the investigation of how far auction theory can lead us under a weaker
hypothesis. For instance, the Characterization Lemma can be understood as a general condition
for bidding behavior, able to describe the behavior of rational bidders without assuming that
bidders follow their equilibrium strategies. We have exposed such a possibility in the introduction
(subsection 1.1).
4 The Indirect Auction Approach
Now we turn to the problem of the existence of equilibrium. We will consider a particularization
of the model in the previous section, that is, we will work according to the following setting:










v(ti,t −i) − bi
m
,
where m is the number of bidders tying and functions pW and pL are the payments made in
the events of winning and losing, respectively. The speciﬁcation of uT
i comes from the standard
solutions to ties: the payment bi = b(−i) is required for any bidder that receives the object, and
the object is split with equal probability among the bidders that are tying.
For further reference, we deﬁne
v1 (s) ≡ E [v (ti,t −i)|ti = s].
We consider an auction with a reserve price of zero.20 We will assume the following natural
conditions for pW and pL:
(H0) Over the domain R+ × R, pW and pL are non-negative, diﬀerentiable, and at least one







Observe that assumption (H0) is rather weak. It is possible, for instance, for the payment to
be non-monotonic with the bid. Nevertheless, we are mainly interested in the following four kinds
of auctions:
18Indeed, the other expressions are similar. To obtain Kn,m (·,·) just substitute n − 1 for n where it occurs in
Mn,m (·,·).T oo b t a i nLn,m (·,·),s u b s t i t u t em − 2 for m − 1 where it occurs in Mn,m (·,·).
19Remember that the independency implies fb(−i) (β|ti)=fb(−i) (β).
20We can relax this assumption. Indeed, most of our results hold for any positive reserve prices, but the expressions
may need some modiﬁcations.
10(F) First-price auctions: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




(S) Second-price auctions: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




(A) All-pay auctions: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




(W) War of attrition: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




In addition to (H0), we will assume the following hypotheses:
(H1) The types are independent and identically distributed, so that T1 = ... = TN = S and
τ1 = ...= τN = σ,w i t hS a compact set and σ a probability measure.
(H2) v is non-negative, continuous and symmetric in its last N − 1 arguments, that is, if t0
−i





= v (ti,t −i).
Observe that we are considering a symmetric auction. Thus, throughout this section, when
we talk about a strategy, we always mean a symmetric one. For instance, Theorem 3 states
that the equilibrium is unique, although it is well known that second-price auctions have multiple
asymmetric equilibria.
We denote the auction above by (S,σ,v). Note that we are still considering multidimensional
types and non-monotonic utilities, with N bidders. Under these assumptions we will introduce
a new approach to prove existence of equilibria in auctions. We call it the “Indirect Auction
Approach”. This is the subject of the following subsections.
4.1 Conjugations
We will be interested in regular bidding functions as deﬁned below:
Deﬁnition 1 – A bounded measurable function b : S → R is regular if the c.d.f.
Fb (c) ≡ Pr{s ∈ S : b(s) <c }
is absolutely continuous and strictly increasing in its support, [b∗,b ∗].21
From the fact that Fb (·) is absolutely continuous, we conclude that Fb (c)=P r{s ∈ S :
b(s) 6 c}.L e t S denote the set of regular functions. Observe that S contains non-monotonic
bidding functions. It is formed by functions b that do not induce ties with positive probability
(because Fb is absolutely continuous) and that do not have gaps in the support of the bids (because
Fb is increasing).
If a bidding function b ∈ S is ﬁxed, let us call the c.d.f. of the maximum bid of the opponents
˜ Pb. That is, we deﬁne the transformation ˜ Pb : R+ → [0,1] by:








t−i ∈ SN−1 : b(tj) 6 c,j 6= i
ª
.
By the deﬁnition of S, ˜ Pb is strictly increasing and its image is the whole interval [0,1].
Now, we will denote by Pb : S → [0,1] the composition Pb = ˜ Pb ◦ b.S o , f o r a ﬁxed b ∈ S,
followed by all players, Pb (ti) is the probability of player i of type ti winning the auction:
Pb (ti)=P r
©





t−i ∈ SN−1 : b(−i) (t−i) 6 b(ti)
ª
.
21The reader should note that we are changing our notation from the previous sections. Since we are now dealing
with the symmetric case, we will note use subscripts. Also, we are not using bold letters to denote functions.
11The following observation is important: from H1, the above function does not depend on i and
Pb (ti) S Pb (tj) if and only if b(ti) S b(tj). Obviously, two players have the same probability of
winning if and only if they play the same bids. So, we have the following:
©




t−i ∈ SN−1 : Pb
(−i) (t−i) <P b (ti)
o
,
where, as natural, Pb
(−i) (t−i) ≡ maxj6=i Pb (tj). The equality of these events implies that
Pb (ti)=P r
n
t−i ∈ SN−1 : Pb
(−i) (t−i) <P b (ti)
o
.
This observation is what will allow us to deﬁne conjugations without mentioning bidding functions.
This will be very important in order to state our results. We have the following:
Deﬁnition 2 – A conjugation for the auction (S,σ,v) is a measurable and surjective function
P : S → [0,1] such that for each i =1 ,. . .N,
P(ti)=P r {t−i ∈ SN−1 : P(−i) (t−i) 6 P (ti)} =[ P r {tj ∈ S : P (tj) <P(ti)}]
N−1 . (8)
Observe that in the above deﬁnition, we do not need to mention the strategy b ∈ S.I t i s
also clear, from the previous discussion, that the deﬁnition is not empty, that is, for any regular
function b ∈ S there exists a conjugation deﬁned by (7) that satisﬁes the above deﬁnition.
Observe also that, since the range of P is [0,1],w eh a v e ,f o ra l lc ∈ [0,1],
Pr
©
t−i ∈ SN−1 : P(−i) (t−i) <c
ª
= c.( 9 )
The above equation will be important in the sequel. It simply means that the distribution of
P(−i) (t−i) is uniform in [0,1].
A natural question that arises is which consistency is necessary between the bidding function
b ∈ S and a conjugation P in order that they become compatible. Equation (7) gives the condition
in one direction. The other direction is very simple, requiring only that the bidding function be
an increasing function of the conjugation. That is, we have the following:
Proposition 1 – Given a conjugation P : S → [0,1], for any increasing function h :[ 0 ,1] →
R+, the function given by b(ti)=h(P (ti)) is consistent with P,t h a ti s ,
P (ti)=P r{t−i : b(tj) <b(ti),∀j 6= i}.
Proof. For an increasing function h :[ 0 ,1] → R+, the function b(ti)=h(P (ti)) is such that
b(ti) S b(tj) if and only if P (ti) S P (tj). Then, {t−i : b(tj) <b(ti), ∀j 6= i} = {t−i : P (tj) 6
P (ti), ∀j 6= i} and the result follows.¥
Proposition 1 says that given a conjugation P, there are many bidding functions that are
consistent with it. In particular, b = P is a bidding function consistent with P.O n t h e o t h e r
hand, given a bidding function, there is just a conjugation Pb that is consistent with it.
4.2 Indirect Auctions
We proceed to deﬁne the indirect auction. We begin by the deﬁnition of (indirect) strategies. To
justify the deﬁnitions, remember that, given a direct strategy b,w eh a v ed e ﬁned Pb as ˜ Pb ◦ b.W e
want the indirect strategy, when composed with the reparametrized type, given by the conjugation










12which will also be increasing. On the other hand, given a conjugation P and an indirect strategy
˜ b, we should deﬁne the related direct strategy as b = ˜ b ◦ P. So the following deﬁnitions are the
natural ones.
Deﬁnition 3 – (i) An indirect bidding function is a bounded increasing function ˜ b :[ 0 ,1] →
R+.
(ii) Given a (direct) bidding function b : S → R+, the indirect bidding function ˜ b :[ 0 ,1] → R+






where ˜ Pb is given by (6).
(iii) Conversely, given an indirect bidding function ˜ b :[ 0 ,1] → R+ and a conjugation P of
(S,σ,v), the direct bidding function associated to ˜ b and P is b : S → R+ given by
b(s)=˜ b ◦ P (s). (11)
Now, we deﬁne the indirect utility function.
Deﬁnition 4 – Fix a conjugation P for an auction (S,σ,v). The indirect utility function of
bidder i associated to this conjugation is ˜ v :[ 0 ,1]
2 → R,g i v e nb y
˜ v(x,y) ≡ E[v(ti,t −i)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y]. (12)
Our method is to construct an auction that will have the above (indirect) utility function. The
reader should keep in mind that the indirect auction is just an auxiliary and ﬁctitious auction that
will help in the analysis of the direct one.
Fix a conjugation P and deﬁne the following function:
˜ Π(x,c) ≡ E [Π(ti,c)|P (ti)=x], (13)
where, Π(ti,c) is the interim payoﬀ of the direct auction, given by (1) in section 2. The notation
should suggest to the reader that ˜ Πi (x,c) will be the payoﬀ function of the indirect auction.
Indeed, the indirect auction will be deﬁned in the sequel in such a way for this to become true. In
Appendix A we prove the following crucial result for our approach:
Proposition 2 –G i v e nb ∈ S, consider the corresponding conjugation P = Pb (as deﬁned




. Alternatively, given a conjugation P and
an indirect bidding function ˜ b,l e tb = ˜ b ◦ P be the corresponding direct bidding function. In any


















(ii) Assume that P is such that for all s with P (s)=x,a n df o ra l lx,y ∈ [0,1],
˜ v (x,y)=E[v(t)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y]=E[v(t)|ti = s,P(−1)(t−i)=y]. (15)
13Then, for all ti such that P (ti)=x and for all c ∈ R,w eh a v e :
˜ Π(x,c)=Π(ti,c). (16)
Observe that, because (14), ˜ Π(x,c) is formally equivalent to the interim payoﬀ of an auction
between two bidders, with signals uniformly distributed in [0,1], where the opponent is following
the strategy ˜ b(·) and the (common-value) utility function is given by ˜ v(x,α).S o , w e d e ﬁne the
indirect auction as follows:
Deﬁnition 5 – G i v e na na u c t i o n(S,σ,v) and a conjugation P for it, the associated indirect
auction is an auction between two players with independent types uniformly distributed in [0,1]
and where the utility function is ˜ v deﬁned by (12). The indirect auction is denoted by
³
˜ S,˜ σ, ˜ v
´
where ˜ σ is the Lebesgue measure in ˜ S =[ 0 ,1].
It is clear through deﬁnitions 1-4 how a conjugation relates the direct auction and the indirect
auction. Obviously, a function ˆ b :[ 0 ,1] → R+ is equilibrium of the indirect auction if for almost




> ˜ Π(x,c), ∀c ∈ R+.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,ˆ b :[ 0 ,1] → R+ is equilibrium of the








. Indeed, to bid above the
support of ˆ b cannot improve the probability of winning and to bid below leads to a zero payoﬀ.22
4.3 Characterization and Suﬃcient Conditions for Regular Equilibria
The results and deﬁnitions of the two previous subsections allow us to show that the existence
of a direct equilibrium implies the existence of the indirect one (Theorem 1, below). Conversely,
(with an extra relatively weak assumption of consistency of payoﬀs), the existence of equilibrium
in indirect auctions allows us to prove the existence in direct ones (Theorem 2).
Theorem 1 – Assume (H0), (H1) and (H2). If there is a pure strategy equilibrium b ∈ S for
the direct auction (S,σ,v) and there exists ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) for all s, then:
(i) the associated conjugation P = Pb (given by (7)) satisﬁes the following property: if s ∈ S
is such that P (s)=x, then:23
E[v(ti,t −i)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=x]=E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,P(−i)(t−i)=x]; (17)




,w h e r e˜ Pb is given by (6), is the increasing
equilibrium of the indirect auction. Moreover, if it is diﬀerentiable at x,i ts a t i s ﬁes the following:
˜ b0 (x)=




















(iii) for all x and y ∈ [0,1],
Z x
y
[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0; (19)
22We are using the implicit assumption that the reserve price is weakly above the minimum utility. See appendix
B for details.
23This condition is related to a condition of Araujo and Moreira (2001).





Remark 1 – One can understand Theorem 1 as saying that if a multidimensional auction
has a regular equilibrium, then it can be reduced to a unidimensional auction (the indirect one).
However, the reader should note that such reduction is non-trivial and that the indirect auction
is not equivalent to the direct one. The indirect auction is a “ﬁctitious” game, where each bidder
is facing up a “ﬁctitious” player, the “opponent”. The “opponent” does not correspond to a real
player. So, the dimension reduction is meant in this particular sense and it is valid even when bids
are multidimensional, but there are just two situations considered for each bidder: to receive or
not the object. This is shown in section 5, where we analyze multidimensional bids.
Observe that the expression in condition (iv) does not depend on the speciﬁcf o r m a to ft h e
payment rules, pW and pL. This is interesting, and implies a kind of Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
Nevertheless, the payment still depends on the conjugation. So, it can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent
auction formats, if the conjugation is diﬀerent. Fortunately, we can prove that for a still general
class of auction the conjugation is unique and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds. Although
of some importance on its own, this result is a natural generalization. What is less expected is the
result presented in Theorem 2. There we prove that condition (iv) (which is, in fact, equivalent to
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem) is an essential part to prove the existence of equilibria.
Theorem 2 is a kind of converse of Theorem 1. The assumptions are exactly the conclusions
of Theorem 1, but for condition (i): we need the slightly stronger condition (i)0. This is the only
reason for not stating an “if and only if” theorem. Fortunately, as we will show in the next section,
there are still interesting cases that permit us to state a simple necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the existence of equilibria.
Theorem 2 – Consider a direct auction (S,σ,v) and a conjugation P for an indirect auction ³
˜ S,˜ σ, ˜ v
´
.A s s u m et h a t
(i)0 for all s ∈ S such that P (s)=x,a n da l ly ∈ [0,1],
˜ v(x,y)=E[v(t)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y]=E[v(t)|ti = s,P(−1)(t−i)=y]; (20)
(ii) there is an increasing function ˜ b, solution of the diﬀerential equation:
˜ b0 (x)=




















(iii) for all x and y ∈ [0,1],
Z x
y
[˜ v (x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0.





Then, there exists an equilibrium of the direct auction, given by b = ˜ b◦P and˜ b is the equilibrium
of the indirect auction. Moreover, if ˜ v is continuous, there exists ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) for all s.
15Proof. See Appendix C.¥
Remark 2 – For the four speciﬁc formats, namely, the ﬁrst-price auction (F), second-price


















Condition (ii) reduces to the requirement that the function ˜ b above is increasing. Observe also that
is possible that the equilibrium exists for an all-pay auction, for instance, but not for a ﬁrst-price
auction.
Remark 3 – Although natural, condition (i)’ can be still too restrictive. We need it in order
to apply Proposition 2 and reach the conclusion that for all ti such that P (ti)=x and for all
c ∈ R,w eh a v e : ˜ Π(x,c)=Π(ti,c) (see (16) in Proposition 2). In turn, this implies that the
equilibrium of the indirect auction is equilibrium of the direct auction. So, instead of assuming
condition (i)’ above, it would be suﬃcient to require the (necessary) condition (i) of Theorem 1
and that it is valid (16).
Theorem 2 simpliﬁes the problem of existence of equilibrium to ﬁnd a conjugation that meets
requirements (i)0 and (ii)-(iv). In the next subsection we treat a still general case where such
conjugation can be easily deﬁned. Nevertheless, before we deal with that case, we would like to
give two examples where the assumptions of the next subsection are not satisﬁed, but where we
still can prove the existence of equilibrium. This is worthwhile, since it provides a kind of heuristics
for the existence problem. The heuristics is based in condition (i)0 and is illustrated in Appendix
D for the examples 6 and 7, below.
Example 6 – Consider a symmetric ﬁrst-price auction with two bidders, types uniformly
distributed on [0,1] and utility function given by:
v(ti,t −i)=ti +
¡




Observe that ∂iv(ti,t −i)=1−4t−i +4tit−i can be negative. Thus, the received theory cannot be
applied. Nevertheless, there exists a monotonic equilibrium. Indeed, in this case, the conjugation
will be given by P (ti)=ti and we obtain
˜ v(x,y)=x +
¡
3 − 4x +2 x2¢
y.
This clearly satisﬁes condition (i)’. Condition (iii) follows from the fact that x>yimplies
Z x
y





3+3 x2 − 8y +3 y2 + x(−4+6 y)
¤
> 0.









24 − 16x +3 x2¢
12
16is increasing. Clearly, the above function implies condition (iv). Thus, there exists a monotonic
equilibrium by Theorem 2.
Nevertheless, this is not the unique equilibrium. If we assume that there exists a U-shaped
equilibrium, the conjugation can be expressed by P (ti)=|c(ti) − ti|,w h e r ec(ti) i st h et y p et h a t








3 − 4c(s)+2 c(s)
2








which simpliﬁes to [s + c(s)][2 − s − c(s)] = 1 ⇒ s + c(s)=1 . Then, c(s)=1− s and P (s)=




























which simpliﬁes to ˜ v(x,y)=
¡
5+x2¢
/4 and condition (i)’ and (iii) are easily seen to be satisﬁed.












is increasing. Then, b(s)=5
4 +
(1−2s)2
12 is a direct equilibrium, and it is plotted in Figure 1.









t  c(t) 
Figure 1: Equilibrium bidding function in Example 6.
Observe that no tie rules are needed in this case, because ties occur with zero probability.
However, for each equilibrium bid, exactly two types pool and have the same probability of winning.
Example 6 has a monotonic equilibrium, as is usual in auction theory, but there is another non-
monotonic equilibrium. Example 7 below shows a case where there is no monotonic equilibrium,
but there is a bell-shaped equilibrium, showed in Figure 2.
Example 7 – Consider again a symmetric ﬁrst-price auction with two bidders and signals uni-













Figure 2: Equilibrium bidding function in Example 7.
In Appendix D, we show that this auction does not have monotonic regular equilibria, but there
is a bell-shaped equilibria as shown in Figure 2.
Example 6 shows that it is possible for a standard auction to have multiplie equilibria. Example
7 suggests that the correct conjugation can fail to exist – at least with a ﬁxed shape (that we
begin by assuming). Thus, one would be interested in cases where it is possible to ensure the
uniqueness of the equilibrium and where it is possible to ﬁnd explicitly the conjugation. We do
this under the context of assumption H3, to be presented in the next subsection.
4.4 Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for the Equilibrium Existence
of Regular Auctions
Theorem 2 teaches us that the question of equilibrium existence is solved if we are able to ﬁnd the
proper conjugation. In examples 6 and 7 of the previous subsection we have shown situations where
the conjugations could be obtained. However, there we assumed some features of the conjugation
that are not necessary and were able to ﬁnd the correct conjugation for those settings. Now we
want to specify a setting where a conjugation always exists. The setting is that of auctions that
satisfy assumptions (H1), (H2) and
(H3) v(ti,t −i) is such that if v(ti,t −i) <v(t0













−i.M o r e o v e r ,i fC ⊂ R has zero Lebesgue measure, then σ{s ∈ S : v1 (s) ∈ C} =0 .
The reader should remember that we deﬁned
v1 (s) ≡ E [v (ti,t −i)|ti = s].
Assumption (H3) is restrictive, but it is the natural context of many economic meaningful
cases. For instance, for separable utilities such as v(ti,t −i)=u1 (ti)+ u2 (t−i), it requires only
that u1 (ti) does not assume any value with positive probability. The same requirement is suﬃcient











¤β,w i t h
α, β, γ > 0. Of course, private values are included in the separable utilities case. It seems that
the majority of utility functions considered in applications satisfy (H3). Of course, there are cases
that do not satisfy it, such as the (mathematical) examples 6 and 7 above. It is also clear that
(H3) can deal with even more complicated dependences, as example 8 below illustrates.
18Example 8 – Consider three bidders with bidimensional signals, each with support equal to
[0,1]
















































It is easy to check that the above function satisﬁes assumption H3 (see Appendix C). Observe that
the private information of any bidder cannot be simpliﬁed to a unidimensional signal because this
will make the expression ot the other’s utilities impossible. Another observation is that the signals
cannot be reparametrized so that the function becomes monotonic in all such reparametrized
signals.24¥
Under (H3), we can deﬁne explicitly the conjugation that will work:
P (ti) ≡ Pr
©
t−i ∈ T−i = SN−1 : v1 (tj) <v 1 (ti),j6= i
ª
. (25)
Then, ˜ v is deﬁned as before (see (12)) for such P,t h a ti s ,
˜ v(x,y)=E[v(t)|P(t1)=x,P(−1)(t−1)=y].
Thus, we can give a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of equilibrium of the
direct auction: merely that the solution ˜ b to the ﬁrst-order condition of the indirect auction be
increasing. This is the content of the following:
Theorem 3 – Consider the auction (S,σ,v) that satisﬁes (H0)-(H3). There exists an equi-
librium b ∈ S and there exists a continuous derivative ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) if and only if there exists a
function ˜ b that is increasing and satisﬁes, for all x ∈ [0,1],
˜ b0 (x)=




















and it is compatible with ˆ p(0) = 0,w h e r e˜ v is given as above and it is continuous. If this is the
case, the equilibrium of the direct auction is given by b = ˜ b ◦ P and the expected payment of a





Moreover, if there is a unique ˜ b that satisﬁes such properties, the equilibrium of the direct auction
in regular pure strategies is also unique.25
Proof. See Appendix C.¥
Remark 4 – As we explained in Remark 1, if a multidimensional auction has a regular
equilibrium, it can always be reduced (in a non-trivial way) to a one dimension auction (the
indirect auction). So, for obtaining equilibrium existence, we have to consider auctions that can
24Of course, if one increases the dimension of the signals to six, for instance, the task can be done. However, the
signals so obtained will be concentrated in Lebesgue measure zero sets.
25The proof also shows the existence of equilibrium even if ˜ v i sn o tc o n t i n u o u s ,b u tt h ep a y m e n ti sg i v e nb y( 2 6 ) .
19be so “reduced”. This is what assumption H3 allows us to explicitly do. It still encompasses
cases where such reduction is not trivial, as we show in examples 9 and 10 below. The reduction
of the dimension of the types is not a novelty in auction theory. While studying the eﬃency of
auctions, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) use a condition close to H3, while Jehiel, Moldovanu and
Stacchetti (1996) made such reduction for the purpose of revenue maximization. Nevertheless,
for the purpose of equilibrium existence in standard auctions, one cannot use only H3 or the
Dasgupta and Maskin’s condition, since the received theory would require the extra assumption of
monotonicity of the reparametrized signals. As we show in examples 10 and 11, this is not always
possible. So, an important feature of Theorem 3 is that it does not require monotonic assumptions.
Example 9 – Spectrum Auction26
Consider a ﬁrst-price auction of a spectrum license.27 The license covers two periods of time:
(1) In the ﬁrst period, the regulator lets the winner explore its monopoly power. Let t1
i be the
estimate of bidder i of the monopolist surplus in this ﬁrst period. Of course, the true surplus will
be better approximated by
¡
t1
1 + ... + t1
N
¢
/ N. If the bidder i (a ﬁrm) wins the auction, it has to
invest t2
i, a privately known amount, to build the network that will support the service. So, in the
ﬁrst period, the license gives to the ﬁrm
t1





(2) In the second period, the regulator makes an estimate of the operational costs of the ﬁrm.
The regulator cannot observe the true operational cost, t3
i, which is a private information of the
ﬁrm. Nevertheless, the regulator has a proxy that is a suﬃcient statistic for the mean operational
cost of all participants in the auction
¡
t3
1 + ... + t3
N
¢
/ N. The regulator will ﬁx a price that will
give zero proﬁtf o raﬁrm with the mean operational costs.28 So, in the second period, the license
gives to the winner
t3





So, the value of the object is given by
v(ti,t −i)=
t1


















, i =1 ,. . . ,N be independent. Observe that the problem cannot
be reduced to a single dimension.29 Also, the model cannot be reparametrized to an increasing
one.30 So, the received theory does not ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibrium for this

















,w i t hs1,




− s2 − s3N − 1
N
− 1 > 0.
26This example is formally similar to example 5 of Dasgupta and Makin (2000), tough it is a bit more complex.
27The example works also for any auctions of public concessions.
28We assume that the regulator is institutionally constrained to follow such a procedure, so the optimality of this
regulation is not an issue.
29Indeed, if we summarize the private information by, say, si = t1
i/N − t2
i + t3
i(1/N − 1),w el o s et h ei n f o r m a t i o n
about t1
i and t3
i that are needed for the value function of bidders j 6= i.
30If we try to put −t3
i in the place of t3
i, then the dependence of v (ti,t −i) on the signals t3
j will be decreasing.
20The derivation in Appendix D indeed provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of equilibrium. Above, we have only simpliﬁed it for a suﬃcient condition.¥
Example 10 – Job Market
We can model the job market (for, say, a manager) as an auction between competing ﬁrms,
where the object is the job contract with that manager. It is natural to assume that the manager
has a multidimensional vector of characteristics, m = (m1, ..., mk). For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the ﬁrms learn such characteristics through interviews and curriculum analysis.
Each ﬁrm also has a position to be ﬁlled by the manager, with speciﬁc requirements for each
dimension of the characteristics. For instance, if dimension 1 is ability to communicate and the
position is to be the manager of a production section, there is level of desirability of this ability.
An overly comunicative person may not be good. The same goes for the other characteristics. A
bank may desire a suﬃciently (but not exaggeratedly) high level of risk loving or audacity on the
part of the manager, while a family business may desire a much lower level. Even eﬃciency or
qualiﬁcation can have a level of desirability. Sometimes, the rejection of a candidate is explained
by over-qualiﬁcation. Therefore, let ti = (t1
i,. . . ,t K
i ) be the value of the characteristics desired by
the ﬁrm.
Since the ﬁrms are competitors, then if one hires the employee, the other will remain with a
vacant position, at least for a time.31 In this way, the winning ﬁrm also beneﬁts from the fact that
its competitors have a vacant position – and, then, are not operating perfectly well. The higher


















where ak is the level of importance of characteristic k of the manager,.bk > 0 represents how
important is the remove from the desired level tk
i of the characteristic k,a n dck is the weight of the
beneﬁtt h a tﬁrm i receives from the fact that the competitors are lacking
P
j6=i tk
j of the ability k.
As in the previous example, we cannot simplify this model for a unidimensional monotonic model.
I nA p p e n d i xDw ea n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sj u s to n ed i m e n s i o n( K =1 ), 2 players (N =2 )
and the types are uniformly distributed in [0,1], b = b1 > 0. We show that if m1 = m>1/2,t h e r e
exists a pure strategy equilibrium in regular strategies if and only if


















Observe that for both cases the value c =0ensures the existence of equilibrium. This is expected,
since it corresponds to a private value auction.¥
Another interesting application of Theorem 3 is the example 1 of JSSZ. This consists in a ﬁrst-
price auction without equilibrium (with the standard tie-breaking rule). Theorem 3 explains why
31Of course, this model works only for non-competitive job markets. In other words, the buyers (the contracting
ﬁrms) have no access to a market with many homogenous employees to hire. This is implicit when we model it as
an auction. So, this is the reason why a ﬁrm that does not contract the manager suﬀers – it is not possible to ﬁnd
a suitable substitute instantaneously. It is possible that this also occurs in other kinds of auctions.
32If the ﬁrms act in a oligopolistic market, it is possible to justify such externality through the fact that the vacant
position inﬂuences the quality of the product delivered by the ﬁrms and, hence, the equilibrium in this market.
21such an auction does not have an equilibrium in regular strategies:33
Example 11 (JSSZ, example 1) – Let us consider a ﬁrst price auction with two bidders,
independent types uniformly distributed in [0,1].L e t v1 (ti)=ti and v2 (t−i)=5− 4t−i.I t i s


















which is decreasing. There is therefore no direct equilibrium b ∈ S.¥
The example above is used by JSSZ to show that equilibrium may fail to exist under the
standard tie-breaking rule. They then provide a general existence result based on endogenous tie-
breaking rules. Unfortunately, their result has some undesirable properties. First, it is in mixed
strategies. Second, the tie-breaking rule is endogenous, so it is not possible to know what rule
has to be applied in order to guarantee the existence. Third, the rule requires that the players
announce their types, which is theoretically convenient but it is unfeasible in the real world.
We oﬀer, in contrast, a method to overcome these diﬃculties. First, the equilibrium is in pure
strategies. Second, the rule is the same for all auctions, so that the players know it before the
game starts. Third, it is a natural method: a modiﬁed second-price auction. Although we could
implement the tie-breaking rule by requiring that types be announced, we do not need to require
this formally. As a matter of fact, we require that the bidders submit bids that will be ranked in
the standard manner. The payment in the case of winning is given by a function of the second
highest bid. The fact that it is a function of the second highest bid (and not the bid itself) is the
reason why we call it a “modiﬁed” second-price auction. The rule is as follows:
Modiﬁed Second-Price Auction Tie-Breaking Rule (MTBR)-I nt h ec a s eo fat i e ,
conduct a modiﬁed second-price auction among the players involved in the tie, as follows. Each
bidder submits a bid b2
i; the bidder with the highest bid wins, receives the object and makes the
payment. The payment is calculated based on the second highest bid, b2
(−i), and it is given by







Observe that the implementation of the above rule does not require any extra information.34
We show now that the above rule ensures the existence of equilibrium for the auctions that we are
considering. Therefore, the generality and simplicity of the rule can be counted as a last advantage
of it.
Theorem 4 - Consider the auction (S,σ,v) that satisﬁes (H0) -(H3). Assume that MTBR is
adopted. Let P be given by (25). If there is a ˜ b that satisﬁes (33) and is compatible with ˆ p(0) = 0
then there is an equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, the expected payment of a bidder of





Proof. See Appendix C.¥
Remark 5 – The main ingredient in the proof of The o r e m4i st h ep a y m e n te x p r e s s i o n .S o ,
the special characteristic of MTBR is the fact that it allows the implementation of the revenue
equivalence in a situation where theu s u a lt i eb r e a k i n gr u l ed o e sn o t . 35
33Of course, it would be possible for an equilibrium to exist that it is not in S or it is in mixed strategy. JSSZ
show that this is not the case with standard tie-breaking rule. They then proceed to show that a tie-breaking rule
that depends on types is suﬃcient to ensure the equilibrium existence.
34Remember that the function v1 is common knowledge.
35In example 11 (example 1 of JSSZ), the MTBR gives a greater revenue than the rule proposed by JSSZ.
22The reader should note that Theorem 4 does not claim the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Indeed, if ˜ b is not increasing, there are many equilibria. There are two sources for this multiplicity.
The ﬁrst source is that under MTBR, any level of the bid in the range where ˜ b is non-monotonic
can be chosen to be the level of the tie. This is shown in the Figure 3. For instance, any a0 can
be chosen between x0 and x1. Once one of the three elements ak, bk or ck is determined, so are
the other two.
However, these possibilities lead to the same expected payment and payoﬀ for each bidder in
the auction, so that Theorem 4 remains as stated.
ak  ck 
bk 
x0 x1  y0  y1 
z1 
z0 
Figure 3: Possible speciﬁcations for the level of the tie.
Another point is that the tie-breaking rule is not unique, in general (although the rule just
deﬁned seems the most natural one). It can be shown, for instance, that for cases where ˜ b is
decreasing (as in example 1 of JSSZ) and for some speciﬁcations of v, there is a continuum of
tie-breaking rules (like that deﬁned by JSSZ for their example 1), which ensures the existence
of equilibrium. All these tie-breaking rules nevertheless imply diﬀerent revenues. In light of this
observation, the existence of equilibrium with an endogenous tie-breaking rule seems even more
problematic as a solution concept, since it can sustain very diﬀerent behaviors at equilibrium.
The reader must observe that the expression of the payment in Theorem 3 depends only on the
conjugation, which is ﬁxed for all kind of auctions. Also, the payment is exactly the same under
t h eM T B R .S o ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Theorem 5 (Revenue Equivalence Theorem) - Consider the auction (S,σ,v) that satisﬁes
(H0) -(H3). Assume that MTBR is adopted. Then, any format of the auction gives the same
revenue, provided the bidders follow a symmetric equilibrium.
4.5 Risk Aversion
Now we would like to show that the theory just developed can be extended to a setting with risk
aversion. For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict ourselves to the private-value case — as Maskin
and Riley (1984) do — and to the ﬁrst-price auction, although it is possible to extend the analysis
23for the setting of the last subsection. So, we assume the following:
ui (t,b)=U
¡






U (v(ti) − bi)
m
,
where m is the number of tying bidders and U : R → R is a utility function. Also, we maintain
(H1), (H3) and make the following assumption for U:
(H4) U is a strictly increasing, bounded and diﬀerentiable function, with U (0) = 0.M o r e o v e r ,
U/U0 is strictly increasing.
(H4) seems a restrictive assumption, but it is implied by the assumptions of Maskin and Riley






Let b0 be the reserve price. We have the following:
Theorem 6 - Consider the auction described above, assume that (H1)-(H4) hold and that ˜ v1
is continuous. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium b ∈ S given by b = ˜ b◦P,w h e r eP is deﬁned







b(x0)=b0,w h e r e˜ v1 (x0)=b0.
(27)
Proof. See Appendix C.¥
5 Multidimensional Bids and Procurement Auctions
In the previous section, we extended the equilibrium existence results from unidimensional to
multidimensional types. Nevertheless, we have considered only unidimensional bids. It is worth
wondering what can be said about multidimensional bids.
Maybe the most obvious example of auctions with multidimensional bids are multiunit auctions.
Indeed, in these auctions each bidder submits prices for each unit to be received. Our model needs
important modiﬁcations to approach this case. This comes from the fact that our assumption of
unitary demand allows us to consider only two situations for each bidder: to receive the object
or not (ignoring the ties). Then, it is suﬃcient to consider just two utility functions, ui and ui,
one for each of these situations. When there are K objects in the auction, and the bidders have
multiunit demand, we need to consider K +1outcomes for each bidder: to end with k =0 , 1, ...,
K objects and, for the outcome of receiving k objects, to consider the utility function uk
i . This will
require the lemma of characterization and the basic principle of bidding to be rephrased in order
to take into account all these new possibilities. It seems reasonable to hope that the approach will
be fruitful in this case, but, of course, careful work is needed to obtain valuable results.
Nevertheless, multiunit auctions are not the only interesting case of auctions with multidimen-
sional bids. Indeed, many single-object auctions have multidimensional bids. For instance, in the
timber auctions conducted by the U.S. Forest Service, the bidders generally are required to submit
individual prices for each kind of trees to be harvested in the tract. Also, in a procurement auction
for an engineering service, a buyer may request prices of the materials and of the working hours
to be spent on the service. Yet another example is a procurement auction of non-homogenous
24products. In this case the bidders have to submit not only the price of the object but also its
characteristics (quality, durability, warranty, reliability, capacity, time to delivery, etc.), that aﬀect
the utility of that product to the buyer. So, it is reasonable for the buyer to take into account such
characteristics (part of the multidimensional bid) when deciding which proposal to accept.
Since the result of the auction for each bidder is only winning or losing, the seller has to specify
a complete order to the multidimensional bids. We can assume that this order is given by a scoring
function. For a real example, if b1
i and b2
i are the prices (bids) submitted by bidder i for the
two species of trees in a tract, the U.S. Forest Service declares the winner to be the bidder with




0,w h e r et1
0 and t2
0 are the estimates for the quantity of
each species made previously by the U.S. Forest Service. Doing so, the Forest Service is trying to
maximize the expected payment that it will receive from the bidders.
In the example of procurement of non-homogenous products, the bid is (pi,q i),w h e r eqi stands
for the quality of the product oﬀered and pi, for its price. The scoring rule can be given by
U (qi) − pi,w h e r eU tries to capture the value that the auctioneer attributes to quality. That is,
the bid (pi,q i) that leads to the higher surplus U (qi) − pi is the winning bid.
In this section, we present two models that analyze the above situations. We could try to give
a general model that incorporates all the above cases, but it would be very complex and it is more
instructive to treat the speciﬁc examples in turn. In subsection 5.1, we analyze a procurement
auction of unit-price contracts. In section 5.2, we treat the case of non-homogenous products.
5.1 Unit-Price Contracts
In this subsection, we present a model of procurement auction with multidimensional bids that
generalizes the model of Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003). Although our model is phrased for pro-
curement auctions, easy adaptations can be made in order to deal with the situation analyzed by
Athey and Levin (2001): the timber auctions conducted by the U.S. Forest Service.
A ﬁrm (or a government) procures a service to be executed. Its engineers estimate the amount
of each input to be used to execute it: materials, working hours, etc. If there are m input factors to
the service, the engineers estimate the amounts t1
0, ..., tm
0 that will be used. We denote the vector
of estimates by t0 =( t1
0,. . . ,t m
0 ).
The potential suppliers of the service (who will be called sellers) have private information about
their technologies. That is, seller i knows the quantity of inputs t1
i, ..., tm
i that he will need to
complete the service. Let ti =( t1
i, ..., tm
i ).
The buyer then conducts a procurement auction, and request the potential suppliers to submit







+. The non-negative number bk
i is the price that seller
i asks for each unit of the k − th input. Based on the vector of bids, the buyer decides to buy the
service from the bidder with the least cost, that is, bidder i such that bi · t0 =m i n j bj · t0,w h e r e




0. In other words, there is a scoring function that is used
by the buyer to evaluate the bids. It is just a function B : Rm → R,g i v e nb yB (bi)=bi · t0.T h e
bid with the lowest score (expected payment) is the winner.
Once the winner is chosen, say bidder i, the buyer signs a contract with him, specifying the
unit price that will be charged, p =
¡
p1,...,pm¢
. The signed contract can be a lowest-score contract
(corresponding to a ﬁrst-price auction), where p · t0 =m i n j B (bj), or a second-score contract, in
which case p · t0 = B(−i) ≡ minj6=i B (bj).36 In the ﬁrst case, p = bi is, then, the contract signed.
I nt h es e c o n dc a s et h eb i d d e ri sf r e et oc h o o s ep in order to met the requirement p · t0 = B(−i).
After the contract is signed, the service is executed, the true amount of inputs used, t1
i,...,tm
i ,
is revealed and the transfer (payment) p·ti is made by the buyer to the seller. We assume that the
buyer can observe the eﬀorts made by the contractor so that there is no moral hazard. It would
be possible to include in the model the possibility of moral hazard, but this will turn the problem
much more complex. However, the reader should note that our assumption is not so restrictive.
36All pay auctions and war of attrition seem inadequate in this setting: the buyer pays something even to those
who do not win. We will not consider these formats.
25We can understand t1
i,...,tm
i as the optimal level of the observable variables that are chosen by
the contractor i, given the technology of observation of the buyer and the technology available
to the contractor. So, the unique true restriction of the model is that, at the moment of bidding
at the auction, the seller has solved all uncertainties regarding its technology, so that his choices
deterministically imply the outcome of the observable.
This kind of contract is called unit-price contract and it is widely used in the real world. A
natural question is “why?” Indeed, one could guess that it would be better (or at least equivalent)
for the buyer to ask for an unidimensional bid: the price of the whole project. Then the buyer could
contract the seller with the cheapest proposal. The intuition for the use of unit-price contracts is
that this enables the contractor and the buyer to share risks. With the unidimensional bid, the
risk becomes entirely on the part of the contractor.
We assume that seller i faces a cost c(ti) of providing the service. The proﬁt of seller i is, then,
p · ti − c(ti).











[p · ti − c(ti)]Pr
£
t0 · bi <B (−i)
¤
Observe that this problem can be broken into two parts. The level β = t0 · bi determines the
probability of winning the auction. Under an optimum level β, the seller is free to choose bi (and
hence, p), which maximizes p · ti − c(ti).









Both problems are linear with linear restrictions and they are formally equivalent. So, the maximum





[p · (ti − t0)+p · t0]



















































































i must choose the same optimum bid. Then,
we deﬁne the conjugation:37
P (ti)=P r
(














, ∀j 6= i
)
.
Also, deﬁne, for all x = P (ti),








which is well deﬁned from the deﬁnition of the conjugation. Observe that types ti with higher




i . Interestingly, in
the unit-price auction, it is not the seller with the lower costs that wins. Indeed, the auction favors













i . Another important observation is that, as we
have said before, the players that conjugated do not need to have the same payoﬀ. This comes






















By the deﬁnition of conjugation, FB(−i) (β (x)) = 1 − x,s ot h a tPr
£
β (x) <B (−i)
¤




β (x) − ˜ c(x)
x
,


























Observe that the ﬁrst term does not depend on β (besides the dependence on B(−i)) and the other
is increasing in β. Since the strategy is increasing in the conjugation, then the solution is given




· t0 − ˜ c(x) > 0 if and only if β >B (−i).T h a ti s ,












Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003) solve just the ﬁrst-score auction for the particular case where
there are two players, the types are unidimensional and the costs linear. The interpretation is that
a l ls e l l e r sa r ea s s u m e dt oh a v et h es a m et y p e( e q u a l to one) for one of the inputs (materials). The
cost is given by c(ti)=cM + cLtL
i ,w h e r ecM is the cost of materials and cL is the cost of labor.
Under these simpliﬁcations, they obtain unimodal behavior (with increasing and decreasing regions
ﬁxed). They can thus show the existence of equilibrium with the standard monotonic methods.
5.2 Non-Homogeneous Products
In this section we consider a procurement auction where the product to be delivered may have
diﬀerent characteristics. In other words, the products are non-homogenous. So, the buyer requires
each seller to submit, together with a price b0







,o ft h e
product the seller plans to deliver. So, the whole bid is the vector bi =( b0
i,b 1
i,. . . ,b m
i ).















. We assume this form of the scoring rule for the sake of simplicity.
Each seller has multidimensional private information ti. The private information is related








by a seller with type ti is c(ti,b c
i).
The payment to the seller is pi in a ﬁrst-score auction. In a second-score auction, the second
highest score, B(−i) ≡ maxj6=i B (bj), has to be matched, but the ﬁrm is free to choose the price and








=( p0,p 1, ..., pm)=bi is signed, the seller ends up with a proﬁto fp0 − c(ti,p c) and
the buyer a utility U (pc) − p0,w h e r eU can (or not) be equal to V . The problem of the bidder is


















B (bi) >B (−i)
¤
Again, the problem can be broken into two parts. For each score level β, the bidder ﬁnds the
contract p = p(ti,β) to solve
h(ti,β) ≡ max
p:B(p)=β
p0 − c(ti,p c).








Let us analyze the ﬁrst problem. The condition is that B (p)=V (pc) − p0 = β.S o ,t h ep r o b l e m
can be simpliﬁed to obtain pc that solves
max
pc∈Rm V (pc) − c(ti,p c),
38Other variations are possible. For instance, the seller may be required to meet the exact bid bj of an opponent
j such that B (bj)=B(−i). Another possibility is to require that the price b0
j of this bidder is matched and to
choose a vector of characteristics b
c






> V (bj).F o rt h es a k eo f
simplicity, we will restrict our attention to the two rules described.
28since the choice p0 = V (pc)−β ensures the restriction of the original problem. Suppose that there
is a unique pc = pc (ti) that solves the above problem.
We obtain h(ti,β)=V (pc (ti)) − c(ti,p c (ti))− β. The second problem is now
max
β>0





It becomes clear that the types with the same level V (pc (ti)) − c(ti,p c (ti)) will bid the same β.
Let v1 (ti) be deﬁned as V (pc (ti))− c(ti,p c (ti)). Then, it is natural to deﬁne the conjugation:
P (ti)=P r
©
t−i ∈ T−i : v1 (tj) <v 1 (ti),∀j 6= i
ª
.




.O b s e r v et h a t˜ v1 (x)=v1 (ti) if P (ti)=x and that v1 (ti)=
˜ v1◦ P (ti).








For the second-score auction, the strategy is simply β
2 (x)=˜ v (x).
6C o n c l u s i o n
Now we would like to highlight what in our opinion are the most important contributions of this
paper and to discuss possible extensions.
6.1 The Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Equilibrium Existence in the Multidimensional Setting - McAdams (2003a) generalizes Athey
(2001) for multidimensional types and actions. Nevertheless, he works with discrete bids and
types. Our approach oﬀers the existence with continuum types and bids. His result is
just an existence result, while ours provides the expressions of the bidding functions. His
assumptions requires monotonicity, which is an undesirable restriction when one tries to work
in multidimensional settings. While we do notn e e ds u c ha na s s u m p t i o n ,o u rr e s u l t sa l s o
do not cover multi-unit as his. JSSZ also gives the existence for multidimensional games,
including cases with dependence, while we require independence. However, they need an
endogenous tie breaking rule and give the existence in mixed strategies, while our results are
in pure strategies.
• Equilibrium Existence in Non-Monotonic Settings - We are not aware of general non-monotonic
equilibrium existence results in pure strategies. Zheng (2001), Athey and Levin (2001) and
Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003) present cases where non-monotonicity arises. The cases in the
last two papers seem important in practice. So, our results develop a theory to deal with the
situations where the usual monotonicity is not fulﬁlled.
• Uniqueness of Equilibrium - We are able to ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium in the
general setting analyzed (under assumption H3), extending the well known uniqueness of
unidimensional and monotonic auctions.
• Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for the Existence of Equilibrium without Ties - The
results of JSSZ do not allow one to distinguish when the special tie-breaking is needed or
not. Our approach clariﬁes, under assumption H3, whether there is a need for a special
tie-breaking rule.
29• Exogenous Tie-Breaking Rule - Knowing exactly when there is a need for a tying with positive
probability, we are able to oﬀer an exogenous tie breaking rule, which has the advantage of
being implemented through a (modiﬁed) second-price auction. Moreover, the equilibrium
t h a tt h er u l ei m p l e m e n t si si np u r es t r a t e g i e s .
• Revenue Equivalence Theorem - We have also generalized the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
(Theorem 5). Futhermore, Theorem 2 and Appendix B show that there is a deep connec-
tion between the revenue equivalence and the existence of equilibrium. Riley and Samuelson
(1981) and Myerson (1981) establish that revenue equivalence is a consequence of the equi-
librium behavior. Proposition 3 in Appendix B shows that the revenue equivalence is also
suﬃcient for the existence of equilibrium, (if another condition is satisﬁed). We are not aware
of this connection being established previously.
So, our results have clariﬁed some aspects of the problem of equilibrium existence in auctions.
The theory shows that, under assumption H3, there is no additional diﬃcult in working with the
more general setting of multidimensional types and non-monotonic utilities besides those diﬃculties
already possible in the unidimensional setting.39 Moreover, this approach allows the equilibrium
bidding functions to be expressed in a simple way. This is so because the equilibrium bidding
function of a general auction can be expressed by the equilibrium bidding function of an auction
with two bidders and uniform types in [0,1].
There are counter-examples for the existence of equilibrium with multidimensional types. See,
for instance, Jackson (1999) and Fang and Morris (2003). These papers consider bidimensional
types, and utilities with both private-value and common-value parts. Reading them, one might
guess that the main problem with the existence is that of the multidimensionality. Our results
suggest two sources for the non-existence: one is the dependence of the signals and the other is the
non-monotonicity of the indirect bidding function. In the later case, it is likely that the tie-breaking
proposed would solve the problem. So, the dependence can be a deeper source for non-existence.40
A last word about the need of tie-breaking rules is worth. Based on Theorem 4, one may conjec-
ture that is always possible to ensure the existence of equilibrium with an exogenous tie-breaking
rule. Also, it is possible to conjecture that for suﬃciently regular utility functions and indepen-
dent types, even discontinuous games have an equilibrium in pure strategies with an exogenous tie
breaking rule. It is to be seen whether these conjectures are correct.
6.2 The Limits of the Method
Our theory makes two important assumptions: independence of the types and symmetry.
The generalization of the approach for dependent types involves some diﬃculties, because the
conjugation would depends in a complicated manner on the types. Nevertheless, we believe that
something can be done if we assume conditional independence, but little can be expected from
this case.41 It is worth remembering that the problem with dependence is not speciﬁct oo u r
approach. Jackson (1999) gives a counter-example for the equilibrium existence of an auction with
bidimensional aﬃliated types. Fang and Morris (2003) also obtain negative results, not only for
the existence of equilibrium but also for the revenue equivalence.
On the other hand, asymmetry does not seem to impose severe restriction on the existence of
equilibrium. We believe that the approach of the indirect auction can be adapted to this case,
although not in a straightforward way. If this can be done, it is unlikely that we will obtain the
simple expressions of this paper.
39Theorem 3 shows that the non-existence of the equilibrium comes from the non-monotonicity of the indirect bid-
ding function. This can occurs also in unidimensional setting, although it can be more common in multidimensional
models.
40For an alternative method to deal with dependence of signals, see de Castro (2004).
41de Castro (2004) proposes the use of conditional independence as an alternative for aﬃliation.
30Another limitation of our theory is that it is applied to single-unit auctions. As we have
discussed in section 5, it seems possible to extend the approach for multi-unit auctions.
Finally, about assumption H3, we would like to comment that, although it is not entirely
general, it does seem to encompass many of the most important economical examples.
31A p p e n d i xA-P r o o fo ft h eB a s i cR e s u l t s













where ui = ui − ui.
We consider each term above separately. The ﬁrst one has a derivative with respect to bi almost
everywhere and is equal to E [∂biui|ti]. The derivative of the last term with respect to bi is just




The second term is diﬀerent from zero just where there is an atom in the distribution of b(−i).
Thus, it is equal to zero for almost all bi, and its derivative is zero almost everywhere.
Now consider the last term in its original form,
R
ui1[bi>b(−i)].L e tan → b
+
i (i.e., an >b i;t h e















Since ui has bounded derivative with respect to almost all bi,
ui(ti,an,·)−ui(ti,bi,·)
an−bi → ∂biui,f o r
almost all bi. Also, 1[an>b(−i)] → 1[bi>b(−i)]. These imply that
ui (ti,a n,·) − ui (ti,b i,·)
an − bi
1[an>b(−i)]→ ∂biui1[bi>b(−i)]
for almost all bi and these functions are (almost everywhere) bounded. By the Lebesgue Theorem,




ui (ti,a n,·) − ui (ti,b i,·)
an − bi
1[an>b(−i)]





Now we want to determine the derivative of the other term. For this purpose, deﬁne for each























32where the existence of lim
r→0
ρ(B(bi,r))
m(B(bi,r)) = Dρ(bi) is ensured by Theorem 8.6 of Rudin (1966) for
almost all bi,t h a ti s ,m
³n





=0 . Theorem 8.6 of Rudin (1966) also says that
Dρ coincides almost everywhere with the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dρ
dm (.) and that











ρ⊥ ([bi,a n)) = 0,
b yt h es a m et h e o r e m .
It is easy to see that ρ is absolutely continuous with respect to Fb(−i). The Radon-Nikodym
Theorem guarantees the existence of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ρ with respect to Fb(−i),




E[ui (ti,b i,·)|ti,b(−i) = β]dFb(−i) (β|ti).
Then, it is easy to see that the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dρ
dm (bi) is simply E[ui (ti,b i,·)|ti,b(−i) (t−i)=
bi]fb(−i) (bi|ti),w h e r efb(−i) (·|ti) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Fb(−i) (·|ti).T h u s ,
∂biΠi(ti,β)=E
h
∂biui (ti,β,·)1[β>b(−i)] + ∂biui (ti,β,·)1[β<b(−i)]|ti
i
+ E[ui (ti,β,·)|ti,b(−i) = β]fb(−i) (β|ti),
















This concludes the proof.¥





























i . Let us denote the conditional expectation42
42We refer the reader to Lehmann (1959) p. 41-5 for a discussion of the concept of conditional expectation and
its properties.
33gti,c (α) ≡ E
h¡











occurs if and only if
h
˜ Pb (c) >Pb
(−i) (t−i)
i











˜ P b(c)>P b
(−i)(t−i)
iΠj6=iσ (dtj).
Now we appeal to the Lemma 2.2, p. 43, of Lehmann (1959). This lemma says the following: if R











In our case, R = Pb






=P r {t−i ∈ SN−1 :







From this and the deﬁnition of ˜ Π
+

























where the second line comes from a interchange of integrals (Fubbini’s Theorem) and the last line
comes from independency and the deﬁnition of ˜ v(φi,α) and gti,c (α) (see (12) and (29)). Also from












Now, we can repeat the above procedures with Π
−











Adding up, that is, putting ˜ Πi (φi,c)=˜ Π
+
i (φi,c) − ˜ Π
−
i (φi,c), we obtain the interim payoﬀ of
the indirect auction. This concludes the proof of the ﬁrst part.



















































by (30) = Π
+
i (s,c),
Obviously, the same can be shown for Π
−
i and ˜ Π
−
i . So, the proof is complete.¥
Appendix B - Indirect Auction Equilibria
In this appendix, we will analyze auctions between two players, with independent types uni-
formly distributed in [0,1]. Since this is the setting of the indirect auction, we will use notation
consistent with that, although the results of this appendix are independent from the results of
section 4. For (i,−i)=( 1 ,2) or (2,1) let
ui (t,b)=v(ti,t −i) − pW (bi,b −i);
ui (t,b)=−pL (bi,b −i);
uT
i (t,b)=
v(ti,t −i) − bi
2
.
If we suppose that this auction has a symmetric increasing equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order condition
(3) simpliﬁes to
˜ b0 (x)=




















We consider an auction with a reserve price of zero. We will assume the following natural conditions
for v, pW and pL:
Assumptions: (I) ˜ v is measurable, non-negative and bounded above. (II) Over the domain
R+ × R, pW and pL are non-negative, diﬀerentiable, and at least one of them is non-constant. If
bi < 0,t h e npW (bi,b −i)=pL (bi,b −i)=0 . (III) There exists an absolutely continuous ˜ b that
satisﬁes (33) almost everywhere in [0,1].
35Observe that assumption (I) is rather weak. For instance, if ˜ v is a conditional expectation of
a measurable non-negative bounded function, it holds. Under so general ˜ v, it is not necessary for
the function ˜ b considered in assumption (III) to be increasing. So, we have to consider an modiﬁed
auction, where the bidders are required to announce a type instead of submitting a bid. We then
show that truth-telling is optimal for the bidders in the modiﬁed auction.
First, observe that, since ˜ b is absolutely continuous over [0,1], its image is an closed interval,
w h i c hw ea s s u m et ob e[b∗,b ∗]. In order not to impose restrictions on the possible bids for a bidder,
we extend the domain of ˜ b from [0,1] to R in order to permit bids out of [b∗,b ∗].T o s u b m i t a
bid b<b ∗, the bidder can announce a type y = b − b∗ < 0, whereas to submit a bid b>b ∗,i ti s
suﬃcient to announce a type y = b − b∗ +1 .I no t h e rw o r d s ,i fy<0, ˜ b(y) ≡ b∗ +y and if y>1,
˜ b(y) ≡ b∗ + y − 1.T h em o d i ﬁed auction is described below.
Modiﬁed Auction - The bidder submits a type y ∈ R. In any event, the payment is de-
termined as if the bidder has submitted the bid ˜ b(y). The bidder wins against opponents who
announce types below y and loses to opponents who announce types above y. If there is a tie, the
object is given with probability 1/2 for each bidder.
Observe that if ˜ b is increasing, the modiﬁed auction is simply the original auction. If ˜ b is
not increasing, the diﬀerence is that the events of winning are not determined by ˜ b but by the







































Now, we can see that the announcement of a type y<0 or y>1 is never proﬁtable because the





























˜ v(x,α)dα − ˆ Π(x,y)
¾
=˜ v(x,y) − ∂yˆ Π(x,y).
Truth-telling is always optimal if
Z x
y
∂yˆ Π(x,α)dα = ˆ Π(x,x) − ˆ Π(x,y) > 0 (35)
36for any x and y. Also, in this case, if there exists ∂yˆ Π(x,y) |y=x, it must be zero, so that
∂yˆ Π(x,y) |y=x=0⇒ ˆ p0 (x)=˜ v(x,x). (36)
Indeed, these are simply the second- and the ﬁrst-order conditions, respectively. We have the
following:
Proposition 3 - If truth-telling is equilibrium of the modiﬁed auction and ˆ Π(x,y) is diﬀeren-





and for all x and y ∈ [0,1],
Z x
y
[˜ v (x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0. (38)
Conversely, assume that (37) and (38) hold. Then, truth-telling is equilibrium of the modiﬁed
auction.
Proof. Observe that ˆ p is non-negative by assumption (II) and its deﬁnition. Then, truth-
telling implies ˆ p(0) = 0,o t h e r w i s eˆ Π(0,0) < 0 and bidder 0 could do better by not participating




[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα (39)
and (38) follows from (35), that is, the fact that truth-telling is equilibrium.
On the other hand, given (37), then (39) holds. Then, (38) implies (35), that is, truth telling
is equilibrium.¥
As we have said before, if ˜ b is increasing, the modiﬁed auction is just the original (unmodiﬁed)
auction. Then, we have
Corollary 4 - Let ˜ b be such that (37) holds. If ˜ b is increasing and (38) also holds, then ˜ b is









[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα. (40)
We also have the following:
Corollary 5 - Assume that ˜ v is continuous and let ˜ b be a solution to (33), compatible with
ˆ p(0) = 0. Then, if ˜ b is increasing and (38) is valid, it is the equilibrium of the original (unmodiﬁed)
auction.













· ˜ b0 (x), (36), together with the initial condition imply (37). So, the hypotheses of Corollary 4 are
satisﬁed.¥
Conversely, we have:
37Corollary 6 -I f˜ b is an increasing equilibrium of the original (unmodiﬁed) auction that satisﬁes




for all x ∈ [0,1], then (37) and (38) hold.
Proof. Since ˜ b is increasing, truth-telling is equilibrium of the modiﬁed auction. Since




· ˜ b0 (x),t h e r ee x i s t s∂yˆ Π(x,y) |y=x for all x.P r o p o s i t i o n 3 g i v e s
the result.¥
Observe that the four kinds of auctions that we have analyzed satisfy the previous assumptions.
Indeed, their payment functions clearly satisfy assumption (II). The equilibrium in the ﬁrst-price
auction (F), second-price auction (S), all-pay auction (A) and war of attrition (W), with reserve
price of zero, are given by (21)-(24). Those functions satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition (33) and are
absolutely continuous, so that assumption (III) is also satisﬁed. Moreover, in each auction format,
it is immediate to see that these strategies lead to (37).
Appendix C - Proofs of the Theorems
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .
(i) If b ∈ S,i td e ﬁnes a conjugation Pb by (7). Since the bid b(ti)=β is optimal for bidder ti
against the strategy b(·) of the opponents, ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) = 0 and this implies that
E
£
v(ti,·)|ti = s,b(−i) (t−i)=β
¤







where the right-hand side does not depend on s (it depends only because β = b(s) is the optimum
bid for such bidder). Thus, the left-hand side has to be the same for all s that are bidding the
same bid in equilibrium, which implies that (17) holds.
(ii) If b(ti) is the c that maximizes Π(ti,c) for all ti with the same P (ti), obviously b(ti) is
also the c that maximizes ˜ Π(P (ti),c). Indeed, this comes from the deﬁnition of ˜ Π(P (ti),c) given




is the equilibrium of the indirect auction.43
(iii) and (iv) Since ˜ b is an increasing equilibrium of the indirect auction, the assumptions of
Corollary 6 in the Appendix B are satisﬁed, which implies directly (iii) and that the payment of









Since b is regular, there is no tie with positive probability. So, only the bid determines the payment.
If we remember that all types that are conjugated bid the same, we see that (iv) holds.¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . In Corollary 4 in Appendix B, we prove that conditions (ii), (iii) and
(iv) are suﬃcient for the equilibrium existence in the indirect auction. Now, Proposition 2 proves
that condition (i)0 implies that for all s such that P (s)=x, ˜ Π(x,c)=Π(s,c) (see (16)). Now, if
we put b(s)=˜ b(P (s)),t h e n
Π(s,b(s)) = ˜ Π
³




43Observe that all t ∈ P−1 (x) bids the same b(t), by the deﬁnition of P.
38B u tt h i si ss u ﬃcient to show the equilibrium existence in the direct auction, since ˜ b is the equilib-
rium in the indirect auction, which implies that
˜ Π
³
P (s),˜ b(P (s))
´
> ˜ Π(P (s),c),
for all c ∈ R.I f˜ v is continuous, ˜ Π(x,c) is diﬀerentiable at all c ∈ R. This concludes the proof.¥
Through the proof of Theorem 3, we will make successive use of the following fact:
Lemma 2 - Assume (H1), (H2) and (H3). For any σ−ﬁeld Σ on SN−1,w eh a v e
∃t−i : v(s0,t −i) >v(s,t−i)
⇔∀ t−i : v(s0,t −i) >v(s,t−i)
⇔ E [v (ti,t −i)|ti = s0,Σ] >E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,Σ], a.s.
Proof.( H 3 )g i v e st h eﬁrst equivalence. By (H2), v is continuous over a compact. So, if ∀t−i :
v (s0,t −i) >v(s,t−i),t h e r ei sδ > 0 so that d(t−i) ≡ v(s0,t −i) − v(s,t−i) − δ > 0 for all t−i.
Then, for any Σ, E [d(t−i)|Σ] > 0 almost surely.44 This implies that E[v (ti,t −i)| ti = s0,Σ] >
E[v(ti,t −i)| ti = s,Σ], a.s. On the other hand, E[v(ti,t −i)| ti = s0,Σ] >E [v(ti,t −i)| ti = s,Σ]
a.s. implies that ∃t−i : v(s0,t −i) >v(s,t−i).¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 .Let us begin with the proof of the necessity. A c c o r d i n gt oT h e o r e m1 ,




(−i)(t−i)=x]=E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,Pb
(−i)(t−i)=x].
If Pb (s)=Pb (s0) and there is some t−i such that v(s,t−i) <v(s0,t −i), Lemma 2 implies that
E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,Pb
(−i)(t−i)=x] <E [v(ti,t −i)|ti = s0,Pb
(−i)(t−i)=x],
which contradicts the previous equality between the conditional expectations. We conclude that
Pb (s)=Pb (s0) ⇒ v(s,t−i)=v(s0,t −i) for all t−i. (41)




and prove that it is non-decreasing. Suppose that
there exist x and y, x>y ,s u c ht h a t˜ v1 (x) < ˜ v1 (y). We will reach a contradiction after a series
of facts.
First, we claim that for all ti and t0
i such that Pb (ti)=x and Pb (t0
i)=y,w eh a v ev(ti,t −i) <
v (t0
i,t −i) for all t−i.O t h e r w i s e , v(ti,t −i) > v (t0




















v (ti,t −i)|Pb (ti)=y
¤
=˜ v1 (y), a contradiction of our initial assumption. Thus, the claim is
proved.
This claim and Lemma 2 imply that











44See, for instance, Kallenberg (2002), Theorem 6.1, p. 104.
39for all z ∈ [0,1],a . s .T h u s ,
Z x
y
[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(y,α)]dα < 0.
By condition (iii) of Theorem 1, we also have that
Z x
y
[˜ v(y,α) − ˜ v (α,α)]dα 6 0.
Summing up these two integrals, we obtain
Z x
y
[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα < 0,
which contradicts condition (iii) of Theorem 1. This contradiction establishes that x>y⇒
˜ v1 (x) > ˜ v1 (y).
Suppose now that there exists x>ysuch that ˜ v1 (x)=˜ v1 (y). Then, the monotonicity of ˜ v1
(just proved) gives
∀φ ∈ [y,x], ˜ v1 (φ)=˜ v1 (x)=˜ v1 (y). (42)
Let S0 =
n
s ∈ S : ˜ b(y) 6 b(s) < ˜ b(x)
o
. From (7), for all s ∈ S0, Pb (s) ∈ [y,x]. Then, (41) and
(42) imply that s ∈ S0 ⇒ v1 (s)=˜ v1 (x). Assumption (H3) requires that σ (S0)=0 .O b s e r v et h a t
S0 = A\B,w h e r eA ≡
n




s ∈ S : b(s) < ˜ b(y)
o
.B u tt h e n ,σ(A)=
σ (B). However, from the deﬁnition of ˜ b as the inverse of ˜ Pb,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :









N−1 − (σ (B))
N−1 ,
which is a contradiction. So, we have proved that x = Pb (s0) >P b (s)=y implies v1 (s0)=
˜ v1 (x) > ˜ v1 (y)=v1 (s) and Pb (s0)=Pb (s) implies v1 (s0)=v1 (s).I n o t h e r w o r d s , Pb (s0) S
Pb (s) if and only if v1 (s0) S v1 (s) which allows us to conclude that
Pb (ti)=P r
©
t−i ∈ T−i = SN−1 : v1 (tj) <v 1 (ti),j6= i
ª
,
as we have deﬁned in (25).
Now, ˜ v and ˜ b i nT h e o r e m1a r ee x a c t l yt h o s ed e ﬁned in the statement of Theorem 3. So,
Theorem 1 implies the claims about ˜ b.M o r e o v e r ,i f ˜ b is unique, the fact that the conjugation is
unique proves that the equilibrium of the direct auction is unique.
Suﬃciency. If we deﬁne P by (25), it is a conjugation. Let us prove that it satisﬁes condition
(i)0.I ff o rs o m ex, y and s,s u c ht h a tP (s)=x,w eh a v e
˜ v(x,y)=E[v(t)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y] <E [v(t)|ti = s,P(−1)(t−i)=y],
then, for at least one t−i and s0, P (s0)=x, v(s,t−i) >v(s0,t −i). But then, by (H3), v(s,t−i) >
v (s0,t −i) for all t−i which implies v1 (s) >v 1 (s0) and P (s) >P(s0), a contradiction with the
assumption that P (s)=P (s0)=x. So, condition (i)0 is satisﬁed.
Let us prove condition (iii) of Theorem 2. If x>y , for all ti and t0
i such that P (t0
i)=x and
P (ti)=y,w eh a v ev(t0
i,t −i) >v(ti,t −i) for all t−i,b y( H 3 ) .T h e n ,f o ra l lz ∈ [0,1],
˜ v (x,z) ≡ E
£




v(ti,t −i)|P (ti)=y,P(−i) (t−i)=z
¤
=˜ v (y,z).
40Then, if y<α <x , ˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α) > 0 and we have:
Z x
y
[˜ v (x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0.
Now if x<α <y ,w eh a v e˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α) < 0 so that condition (iii) is satisﬁed. Condition
(iv) of Theorem 2 follows from Corollary 5 in Appendix B.45 Now, since ˜ b satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition and is increasing by assumption, Theorem 2 implies the existence of equilibrium, with
the equilibrium bidding function given by b = ˜ b ◦ P.




for all x, y
∈ [0,1].S i n c e Π(s,b(x)) = ˜ Π
³
P (s),˜ b(P (x))
´
,t h e r ee x i s t s∂bΠ(s,b) and it is continuous on
b. Observe that this assumption is used only for the proof of this last fact and for the proof of
condition (iv). Then, if we assume condition (iv) instead of ˜ v being continuous, the equilibrium
existence would also follow.¥
Proof of Theorem 4.I f ˜ b is strictly increasing, it is a symmetric equilibrium by Theorem
3. If it is not, let b(x)=s u p α∈[0,x]˜ b(α). As we discussed after the statement of Theorem 4, this
is just one of the possible speciﬁcation for the equilibrium bidding function. Remember that ˜ b is
absolutely continuous. Then, there is an enumerable set of intervals [ak,c k] where b(x) is constant.








Figure 4: Indirect Equilibrium Bidding Function
Therefore, there is a tie among the indirect types in [ak,c k]. The tie is solved by the MTBR.
We show that it is a dominant strategy for the modiﬁed second-price auction to bid b2
i = v1 (ti).
Suppose that the opponent is following this strategy, that is, b2






















if player i bids b2
i = v1 (ti)=˜ v1 (x) when P (ti)=x, then he will win (and receive ˜ v(x,z)−˜ v (z,z))
45We could have established condition (iii) also from that Corollary. We preferred to establish it directly to
observe that the existence of equilibrium would follow if, instead of assuming ˜ v continuous, we assumed condition
(iv) directly.
41if and only if x>z , which is equivalent to ˜ v(x,z) > ˜ v(z,z), by the proof of Theorem 3. So this
is the optimum bid for him. This proves that this strategy is an equilibrium for the modiﬁed
second-price auction and we assume that this is the equilibrium played in case of a tie. Then,
following this strategy, each participant is, indeed, getting the payoﬀ
Z x
ak
[˜ v(x,z) − ˜ v(z,z)]dz.
Thus, in the whole auction, the bidder who follows the strategy b(x) and, in case of a tie, the








[˜ v(x,z) − ˜ v(z,z)]dz.








[˜ v(x,z) − ˜ v (z,z)]dz,
if b(y) is not a bid with positive probability. So, the MTBR implements the modiﬁed auction
deﬁned in Appendix B. By Proposition 3 there, the assumptions of Theorem 4 ensure the existence
of equilibrium of the modiﬁed auction, and hence of the indirect auction. Under the properties of
the conjugation, all the assumptions of Proposition 2 are satisﬁed, so that the equilibrium of the
indirect auction is also an equilibrium of the direct one.¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 . Suppose ﬁrst that there is an equilibrium b ∈ S.W e b e g i n b y
reproducing the ﬁrst argument of Theorem 1. If b ∈ S is the equilibrium, then the ﬁrst-order

















v1 (ti) − β
¢




The right-hand side does not depend on ti (it depends only because β = b(ti) is the optimum bid
for such bidder). Thus, the left-hand side has to be the same for all s = ti that are bidding β in
equilibrium. By (H4), this implies that all conjugated types have the same v1 (ti) − β, and hence,
the same v1 (ti). So, the conjugation is the one deﬁned in (25) and it is unique. The indirect
equilibrium has to be given by (27), which can be seen from Maskin and Riley (1984).
On the other hand, the function ˜ b,s o l u t i o no ft h eﬁrst-order condition of the indirect auction
is increasing, because we are in a private-value setting. Now, we have just to check that the signal
of the derivative of Π at the equilibrium:
U
³















v1 (x) −˜ b(y)
´ R ˜ b0 (y)




R 0 if and only if x R y. This concludes proof.¥
427 Appendix D - Proofs for the Examples
P r o o fo fe x a m p l e7 .
First, let us show that there is no monotonic equilibria for this auction. By contradiction,
assume that there is a increasing bidding function. Then, P (ti)=ti−1.5
1.5 and condition (i)’ is
trivial. We have
˜ v(x,y)=( 1 .5x +1 .5)
·





9(x +1 )( 2 y − x +1 )
8
Thus, the necessary condition (iii) is not satisﬁed, because x>yimplies
Z x
y





Now, we will show that there are multiple equilibria for this auction. Assume that there exists
a bell-shaped equilibrium and that, for each x,t h e r ea r et w ot y p e s ,f (x) and g(x) such that
P (ti)=x =
3−g(x)+f(x)−1.5
1.5 , which implies that g(x)=f (x)+1.5(1− x).( S e eF i g u r e5 ) .












g(x)  f(x) 
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24 + 3x − x2¢
32
is increasing on [0,1].¥

































































− v(t1,t −1) depends only on ˜ t1 and t1.¥
Proof for Example 9 - Spectrum Auction


























































































































/N > 0, b = −
¡
s2 − s2¢
< 0, c = −(N − 1)
¡
s3 − s3¢






















It is elementary to obtain that, for a uniform distribution in [0,1]





3 : ax + by + cz < l
o
=

















































which is diﬀerentiable, with ˜ b0 (x)=[ ˜ v(x,x) − x]/x. Then, Theorem 3 teaches us that there exists
an equilibrium in regular pure strategies for this auction if and only if
˜ v(x,x) − x =
½




























v1 (tj)= ˜ P−1 (x)
#
is positive. Depending on the values of sn, sn, for n =1 , 2, 3, the above expression can be positive
or negative. If it is always positive, ˜ b is increasing and it is the equilibrium of the indirect auction.
In the other case, there is no equilibrium without ties. For instance, a suﬃcient condition for the
existence of equilibrium in pure strategy is
s1
N
− s2 − s3N − 1
N
− 1 > 0,
since the expectation above is always positive.¥
Proof for Example 10 - Job Market
45We assume that there are two players with unidimensional signals uniformly distributed on




− b(ti − m)
2 .
We will consider two cases.





1 − 2m +2 ti,i f 0 6 ti <m
1 − 2ti +2 m,i f m 6 ti < 2m






am + c(1 − y) − b(1 − x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x,y < 1 − 2m
am + c(1 − y) − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 0 6 y<1 − 2m 6 x 6 1
(a + c)m − b(1 − x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x<1 − 2m 6 y 6 1
(a + c)m − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 1 − 2m 6 x,y 6 1



























which is increasing if
xV =
c
2 + b(m − 1)
−2b
3
> 1 − 2m,
that is, if c 6
2b(m+1)









6am +3 c(1 + 2m) − 2b
¡













6(c − 2cm +2 amx +2 cmx) − b
¡
3 − 12m +1 2 m2 +3 x − 3x2 + x3¢
12x
=
(1 − 2m)[2c − b(1 − 2m)]
4x








whose derivative can be simpliﬁed to
˜ b0 (x)=−




46The term x2 (3 − 2x) is increasing, so that, the bidding function will be increasing if and only if
˜ b0 (1 − 2m) > 0,t h a ti s ,
(1 − 2m)
2 b[3 − 2(1− 2m)]
3




We conclude that in the case of m<1/2, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in regular















ti,i f 0 6 ti < 2m − 1,
1 − 2m +2 ti,i f 2m − 1 6 ti <m






am + cy − b(x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x,y < 2m − 1
am + cy − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 0 6 y<2m − 1 6 x 6 1
(a + c)m − b(x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x<2m − 1 6 y 6 1
(a + c)m − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 2m − 1 6 x,y 6 1

































¢ > 2m − 1,
that is, c > 2
3b(m − 2).F o rx>2m − 1,
˜ b(x)=




12(a + c)m − b
¡










F o l l o w i n gt h es a m ep r o c e d u r eo ft h eﬁrst case, ˜ b0 (x) > 0,∀x ∈ [2m − 1,1] if and only if
(2m − 1)
2 b[3 − 2(2m − 1)]
3
> −(2m − 1)[2c + b(2m − 1)]
⇔ c > −
2b(2m − 1)(1 + m)
3
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